Secondly, Russell takes on the natural law argument which states that nature behaves in a uniform fashion, not a random one; scientific analysis and observation lends itself to assuming certain laws like that of thermodynamics and gravity and motion that could not be got over through chance. Instead these laws presuppose a Lawgiver, namely God. Reasoning in such a manner to Russell demonstrated certain fallacies that were conducive to proving atheism. He first indicated that the existence of these laws was more or less the existence of statistical averages that emerge from chance, the prime example of this fact being the movement and behavior of the atoms which are random, not orderly. Yet, he later contradicts himself while combating the idea of free will theism saying that while atoms are somewhat random, the visible movement of atoms as played out in motion demonstrate "old laws" that show a necessary action based on physics, not a free one based on the will of the individual. This verifies the inconsistency in Russell's argumentation.
Also, the basis of such an argument sets up a false dichotomy between natural laws, and laws given by humans, says Russell. Judicial laws presuppose a human lawgiver because they concern the human sphere. Natural laws on the other hand are mere descriptions of how things happen. At the same time, this descriptor language could be applied to human laws as well. If one commits a certain reaction like murder, one will get a certain reaction, like the death penalty; it is a mere description of what happens. So the issue for Russell then is semantics because while the laws of motion, for instance, describe what will occur when an object is put into motion, the law still presuppose not a random chain of events, but instead one that is based upon an orderly world. Otherwise, there is no need to speak of physics or make inquiries into the subject if perchance the actions of the universe have no basis. The whole process of observing and inferring logical constructions from the experience and perception indicated becomes a fruitless project if those logical constructions are random and not orderly and binding, for then their probability is even less certain. But to Russell, the possibility still is more likely that these so-called laws are random events rather than ordered processes handed down from a Lawgiver. Once again, he seems to be inferring things that are not based on his own system of logical analysis.
Finally, Russell reasons that such a position demonstrates the holes in the logic of the believer. For if one says that there is a reason God gives laws, which almost inevitably Christians would say, then a law must exist outside of the divine edict, hence such a divine edict is ultimate, not the lawgiver Himself. This fails to bend the debate toward his side as well. For the Christian maintains that the greates end to the law is the glorification of God, which is the truest expression of what is right and beautiful. Thus, God Himself becomes the ultimate reality and the ultimate expression of goodness. Right and wrong are based upon what honors Him most and what runs counter to His character. Thus, Russell has insufficiently caused doubt based on his supposed rebuttal of the natural law argument.
[1] Bertrand Russell., Why I Am Not a Christian, and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects (Simon and Schuster, Inc.: New York, NY), 39.
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